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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2578

E.O. 11652: SGDS-1

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE: UNCLASSIFIED VERSION

REF: A. USNATO 2301

B. STATE 096508

1. INTERNATIONAL STAFF (IS) HAS CIRCULATED DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED VERIONS
(QOUTEDBELOW) OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE AND OF COMMUNIQUE FOR PUBLICATI
ON
AT FORTHCOMING DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE (DPC) MINISTERIAL MEETING
(REF A).

2. WHILE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE UNDERSTANDABLY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL WORK,
MISSION BELIEVES SUBSTANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DRAFT
SQUARES WITH WASHINGTON OBJECTIVES (REF B, PARA 5). DURING MAY 12
INFORMAL DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC) MEEING, MISSION PROPOSES TO:
A) RESIST ANTICIPATED EFFORTS BY SOME DELEGATIONS TO REDUCE SUB-
STANTIVE CONTENT OF UNCLASSIFIED GUIDANCE DRAFT;
B) SUPPORT PUBLIC CIRCULATION OF UNCLASSIFIED
GUIDANCE DRAFT AS ADDENDUM TO COMMUNIQUE; AND
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C) SEEK DRC SUPPORT FOR NATO INFORMATION SERVICE PREPARATION AND
DISSEMINATION OF UNCLASSIFIED BOOKLET ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE
ALONG LINES OF THAT PRODUCED FOR AD-70 PROGRAM IN EARLY 1970'S.

BEGIN TEXT OF IS COVER NOTE:

IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO PREPARE AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, SUITABLE FOR PUBLICATION IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE DEFENCE MINISTERS' COMMUNIQUE. A DRAFT OF SUCH A DOCUMENT IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX I.

2. I ALSO ATTACH THE FIRST DRAFT OF A COMMUNIQUE AT ANNEX II.

3. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE COMMITTEE DISCUSS BOTH DOCUMENTS AT AN UNOFFICIAL MEETING TO BE HALD AT 10.15 A.M. ON MONDAY, 12TH MAY. ATTENDANCE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL BE WELCOME BUT NOT OBLIGATORY. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975

INTRODUCTION

1. NATO PROCEDURES FOR DEFENCE PLANNING CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE EVERY TWO YEARS FOR THE FORCE PROPOSALS TO BE PREPARED BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS AND FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STEPS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF FORCE GOALS. THE GUIDANCE REFLECTS THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO FORCES DURING THE NEXT PLANNING PERIOD, AND THE IMPACT OF THESE FACTORS ON NATO STRATEGY.

2. THE GUIDANCE, BEING A MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENT ENDORSED BY MINISTERS, ALSO PROVIDES A REFERENCE POINT AND DIRECTIVE FOR ALL DEFENCE PLANNING ACTIVITIES INCLUDING SUPPORTING PROGRAMMES, BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IN NATO. ITS CONTENTS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING DIRECTIVES.

LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT

3. PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE HAVE COVERED THE SEVER-YEAR PERIOD OF THE NATO DEFENCE PLANNING CONFIDENTIAL

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CYCL. HOWEVER, LENGTHENED TIMESCALES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPON SYSTEMS TOGETHER WITH INCREASED COSTS OF MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT NOW MAKE IT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMWORK FOR DEFENCE PLANNING. TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE FACTORS A LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT HAS BEEN ADOPTED, WHICH PLACES INCREASED EMPHISIS ON CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RIGOROUS PRIORITIES.

4. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE UNDERLINE THE INESCAPABLE NECESSITY FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION OR THE

THREAT OF IT, AND IF DETERRENCE FAILS, TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. THE MEMBERS OF NATO ARE SEEKING IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT NEGOTIATIONS ARE SLOW. MEANWHILE THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS CONTINUE TO EXPAND. CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF NATO'S DEFENSIVE STRENGTH WILL FURNISH A SECURE BASIS FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING A BAR TO AGGRESSION OR THREATS OF AGGRESSION.

5. THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT SUPPORTS AGREED NATO STRATEGY BY CALLING FOR A BALANCED FORCE STRUCTURE OF INTERDEPENDENT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATRE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES. EACH ELEMENT OF THIS TRIAD PERFORMS A UNIQUE ROLE; IN COMBINATION THEY PROVIDE MUTUAL SUPPORT AND REINFORCEMENT. NO SINGLE ELEMENT OF THE TRIAD CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR ANOTHER.

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6. THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT CALLS FOR THE MODERNISATION OF BOTH STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES; HOWEVER MAJOR EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. NATO HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED A LARGE MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD; ALLIES HAVE FIELDDED THE BASIC INGREDIENTS FOR A STALWART CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. HOWEVER DISPARITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES REMAIN. THE ALLIES MUST REDUCE THESE DISPARITIES AND PROVIDE A STABLE, LONG-TERM BASIS FOR ATTAINING AND MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

7. THE ESSENCE OF THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT IS THAT NATO CAN ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IF NATIONAL FORCES WORK TOGETHER MORE EFFICIENTLY, IF ALLIES CONTINUE CURRENT LEVELS OF DEFENCE RESOURCES ALLOCATIONS (MARGINALLY INCREASED IN REAL TERMS) AND IF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PLANNING AUTHORITIES SET AND APPLY RIGOROUS PRIORITIES FOR FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. TO ACHIEVE THIS IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR:
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(A) THE ALLIES TO MAKE STEADFAST COMMITMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE FORCES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE OR FORESEEN IN PLANS CURRENTLY DECLARED TO NATO- WHETHER FORMALLY COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE OR NOT-AND TO CONTINUE TO MODERNISE AND IMPROVE THESE FORCES AND ASSOCIATED COMMON SUPPORTING FACILITIES;

(B) NATO COUNTRIES TO ALLOCATE, IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIANCE, SOME MODES ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL VALUE TO DEFENCE EXPENDITURES. THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE REQUIRED IN EACH COUNTRY WILL VARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CURRENT CAPABILITIES, ITS PRESENT EFFORTS AND ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH;

(C) NATO AS A WHOLE AND ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES TO MAKE BETTER USE OF DEFENCE RESOURCES THROUGH:

(I) RIGOROUS SETTING OF PRIORITIES THAT ARE SPECIFIC AND FEW;

(II) REALISTIC RESOURCE GUIDANCE FOR PLANNING THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT OF MEMBER COUNTRIES; AND

(III) RATIONALISATION ACROSS COUNTRIES, STANDARDISATION, AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR MORE FLEXIBLE USE OF FORCES- ALL OF WHICH REQUIRE GREATER CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

8. THE LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL HELP TO PROVIDE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE BASIS FOR NATO PLANNING WITH BOTH THE FLEXIBILITY TO ABSORB EFFECTS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MILITARY PROGRAMMES AND THE STABILITY TO PREVENT DANGEROUS, EXPENSIVE FLUCTUATIONS IN STANDING DEFENCE FORCES. IT COULD ALSO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR INFORMATION NEEDED BY ALLIED PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS TO EVALUATE AND SUPPORT NATO'S NATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMMES.

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SOVIET POLICY

9. THE SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WEST ON CERTAIN BROAD ISSUES OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY, E.G. BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS (SALT) AND ON CERTAIN OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND ALSO THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE IN EAST- WEST RELATIONS SEEN OVER THE LAST DECADE HAS IMPROVED, THE BENEFITS IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY STILL REMAIN TO BE IDENTIFIED AND DO NOT ALTER THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THIS GUIDANCE IS BASED.

10. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE RENOUNCED THEIR AIM OF EXTENDING SOVIET POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION AND THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS WHEREVER THEY CAN DO SO WITHOUT UNDUE MILITARY RISK. THESE POLICIES WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE USE, DIRECT AND INDIRECT, OF THEIR MILITARY POWER, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE BUILT UP WITHOUT LOSS OF MOMENTUM ON A WORLD-WIDE SCALE.

11. THE WARSAW PACT ALREADY POSSESS A MILITARY CAPABILITY MUCH GREATER THAN THAT NEEDED FOR SELF-DEFENCE. IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FIELD THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING ALREADY ATTAINED ROUGH PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, NOW SEEMS TO BE SEEKING TO ATTAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE SOPHISTICATED AND POWERFUL MISSILES. IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR FORCES; THE INCREASE IN THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THESE FORCES, REPRESENTED BY NEW AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND ARTILLERY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE ARE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. AT SEA THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES OVER THE PAST DECADE AND THEIR WORLD-WIDE DEPLOYMENT HAVE ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO THE THREAT. THERE IS NOW THE POSSIBILITY THAT, INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY, THE SOVIET UNION MAY CHOOSE TO USE HER GROWING MARITIME

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CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO FORCES AT SEA OR AGAINST THE MARITIME LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN ORDER TO INTERFERE WITH THE ECONOMIES AND VITAL SUPPLIES OF NATO NATIONS.

12. THE MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD

BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY IS CLOSELY RELATED TO NATO'S WILL AND CAPABILITY TO REACT, AND TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THIS. SHOULD WEAKNESSES IN OUR POLITICAL RESOLVE, OR INADEQUACIES IN THE SCALE OF EFFORT WE DEVOTE TO OUR OWN DEFENCE CAUSE THE WARSAE PACT TO DOUBT THE ULTIMATE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALIANCE, OUR GENERAL READINESS TO WITHSTAND POLITICAL PRESSURE OR OUR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND OURSELVES BY ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL AGAINST AGGRESSION, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO USE THE MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE TO THEM TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE OR MOUNT A DELIBERATE ACCTACK ON NATO. THE COMMON DEFENCE OF THE ALLIANCE IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE. THE ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON ONE OR MORE OF THEM AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL.

NATO STRATEGY

13. THE AIM OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED, BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO ANY AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATACK ON NATO WOULD BE MET BY A STRONG DEFENCE AND MIGHT INITIATE A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE, AND WHICH INVOLVES RISKS TO THE AGGRESSOR OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ANY ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN. IN AN ERA OF BROAD

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STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY DETERRENCE TO ALL FORMS OF AGGRESSION CANNOT CREDIBLY BE BASED UPON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ALONE; IT MUST BE PROVIDED BY THE OVERALL

CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES. THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT NEED NOR INTEND TO MATCH WARSAW PACT FORCE CAPABILITIES IN EVERY RESPECT, BUT IT MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND. THE RESPONSE MUST BE EFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO THE LEVEL OF FORCE USED BY THE AGGRESSOR AND MUST ALSO CARRY WITH IT THE THREAT OF ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL.

14. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY AIM IS TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE. NATO FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY CAPABILITIES AT THEIR DISPOSAL (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) FOR THIS PURPOSE AND THIS DETERMINATION MUST BE EVIDENT TO THE AGGRESSOR. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION, E.G. TO CONDUCT A DIRECT DEFENCE, TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT DELIBERATELY IN ORDER TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMISTAKABLE CONFIDENTIAL

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FORCE THE RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION, OR A COMBINATION OF THESE, OR GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

PURPOSE OF NATO FORCES

15. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY NATO NEEDS CONVENTIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIRFORCES, A CAPABILITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THESE ELEMENTS OF NATO FORCES SHOULD EACH POSSESS A CREDIBILITY OF THEIR OWN, AND SHOULD COMBINE TO PRODUCE AN INTERLOCKING SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. SPECIFICALLY:

(A) THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO RESIST AND REPEL A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE, AND TO DETER LARGER SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS THROUGH THE PROSPECT OF AN EXPANSION OF THE AREA, SCALE AND INTENSITY OF HOSTILITIES WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A DEFENCE IN THE FORWARD AREAS SUFFICIENT TO INFLICT SERIOUS LOSSES ON THE AGGRESSOR AND CONVINCE HIM OF THE RISKS OF SUCH ESCALATION;

(B) THE PURPOSE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE EFFECT OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, AND TO DETER THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE

AGGRESSOR. IT SHOULD PROVIDE A SOURCE
OF LIMITED AND CONTROLLED OPTIONS
SHORT OF THE USE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
FORCES. ITS AIM IS TO CONVINCE THE
AGGRESSOR THAT ANY FORM OF ATTACK ON
NATO COULD RESULT IN VERY SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO HIS OWN FORCES, AND TO
EMPHASISE THE DANGERS IMPLICIT IN THE
CONTINUANCE OF A CONFLICT BY PRESENTING
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HIM WITH THE RISK THAT SUCH A SITUATION
COULD ESCALATE BEYOND HIS CONTROL UP TO
ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR. CONVERSELY, THIS
CAPABILITY SHOULD BE OF SUCH A NATURE
THAT CONTROL OF THE SITUATION WOULD
REMAIN AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN NATO HANDS;

(C) IT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR FORCES TO STRENGTHEN FLEXIBLE
RESPONSE OPTIONS, TO PROVIDE THE
CAPABILITY OF EXTENDING DETERRENCE
ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES,
AND TO PROVIDE AN ULTIMATE SANCTION
FOR THE OVERALL STRATEGY.

THESE PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE APPLY TO
AGGRESSION AT SEA AS WELL AS ON LAND.

RESOURCES AND THEIR USE

RESOURCES

16. UNTIL THERE IS A DOWNWARD TREND IN THE WARSAW
PACT FORCE LEVELS, POSSIBLY AS A RESULT OF MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS, NATO'S PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS
THE WARSAW PACT WILL AT LEAST HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED.
THIS IMPLIES THE MAINTENANCE OF THE LEVELS OF FORCES
ALREADY IN EXISTENCE OR FORESEEN IN PLANS CURRENTLY
DECLARED TO NATO AND PROVISION FOR THE REGULAR
REPLACEMENT AND MODERNISATION OF JAMO EQUIPMENT. THIS
MUST BE THE BASIC PRINCIPLE WHICH DETERMINES THE
ANNUAL AND LONG-TERM ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE
PURPOSES IN ALL COUNTRIES.

17 IN RECENT YEARS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF DEFENCE
RESOURCE PLANNING HAS BEEN THE PHENOMENON THAT
OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES (MOSTLY DUE TO
DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL COSTS) HAVE RISEN
SHARPLY, AND THAT INCREASES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS HAVE
NOT KEPT PACE IN GENERAL WITH THE RATES OF INCREASE
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OF THESE COSTS. THIS HAS PUT AT RISK, AND IN A
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED, THE
PROPORTION OF THE BUDGET AVAILABLE FOR CAPITAL
INVESTMENT, RESULTING IN THE POSTPONEMENT, LOWERING
DOWN OR EVEN CANCELLATION OF MUCH-NEEDED REPLACEMENT
AND MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
PLANNED FORCE LEVELS AND ALSO TO ALLOW FOR ESSENTIAL
EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION, APPROPRIATE PROVISION SHOULD
BE MADE TO COMPENSATE IN FULL FOR NECESSARY OR
UNAVOIDABLE INCREASES IN RUNNING COSTS, (INCLUDING
PERSONNEL COSTS) DUE TO INFLATION AND OTHER CAUSES.

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IN ADDITION, THE SHARES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS DEVOTED TO
MAJOR NEW EQUIPMENT NEED TO BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY
IN MOST COUNTRIES.

18. THESE AIMS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY A MODEST ANNUAL
INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES. DEFENCE
EXPENDITURES IN REAL TERMS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
DROP BELOW THEIR PRESENT LEVELS; THE ACTUAL INCREASE
WILL VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEPENDING ON ITS
EXISTING FORCE CAPABILITIES, ITS PRESENT EFFORT AND ITS
ECONOMIC STRENGTH. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SOLIDARITY
OF THE ALLIANCE THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE SEEN TO
BE MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENCE WHICH
IS COMMENSURATE WITH ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH. ONLY

THUS CAN COUNTRIES HONOUR THE OBLIGATION ASSUMED
IN THE OTTAWA DECLARATION TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE
THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR FORCES AND TO UNDERTAKE THEIR
PROPOER SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF MAINTAINING THE SEUCRITY
OF ALL.

ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION
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19. NATO DEFENCE PROGRAMMES ARE ORGANISED FOR
THE MOST PART ON A STRICUTLY NATIONAL BASIS. THE
EXISTENCE OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS
OF FINANCEARE BOUND TO PLACE SOME LIMITS ON THE
DEGREE TO WHICH INTREGRATION OF COMMON PROGRAMMES CAN
BE ACHIEVED; NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
POSSIBILITIRES FOR CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT WHERE A MORE
ACTIVE APPROACH IS NOW REQUIRED. THESE LIE IN THE
FIELDS OF RATIONALISATION AND SPECIALIZATION,
FLEXIBILITY, STANDARDISATION AND CO-OPERATION IN
ARMAMENTS PROCUREMENT AND APPLY BOTH TO THE OPERATIONAL
ROLES OF FORCES AND TO THEIR SUPPORT.

20. RATIONALISATION AND SPECILAIISATION.

RATIONALISATION AND SPECIALISATION INVOLVE THE
ELIMINATION OF REDUNDANT PROGRAMMES, THE CONSOLIDATION
OF SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ADJUSTMENT OF
MISSIONS AND COMPOSITION AMONG NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF
NATO FORCES. SUCH REALLOCATIONS CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT
COMPLETELY WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIE, BUT ONLY
ACROSS A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHOSE
FORCES INTERACT GEOGRAPHICALLY. ATTENTION SHOULD BE
CONCENTRATED INITIALLY ON FIELDS WHICH HOLD THE MOST
POTENTIAL FOR EARLY PROGRESS INCLUDING COMMUNICATIONS,
LOGISTICS AND TRAINING. SAVINGS PRODUCED SHOULD BE
INVESTED IN HIGH PRIORITY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS,
MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES, AND COMMON-FUNDED PROGRAMMES.
RATIONALISATION SHOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY DIMINUTION OF
THE OVERALL FORCE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE NOR OF
THE TOTAL DEFENCE EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES;
NOR SHOULDIT PROVIDE AN OBSTACLE TO THE SMALLER
COUNTRIES IN THEIR ENDEAVOURS TO IMPROVE THEIR
TECHNOLOGY.

21. FLEXIBILITY. IN THE OPERATIONAL FIELD NATO
MUST MAKE THE OPTIMUM USE OF ITS AVAILABLE FORCES.
THE AIM SHOULD E TO ELIMINATE EXISTING CONSTRAINTS,
WHETHER POLITICAL, DOCTRINAL, TECHNICAL OR
ORGANISATIONAL. TTO THIS END COMMAND AND CONTROL
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ARRANGEMENTS, LOGISTICS, MOBILITY, COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS AND EXERCISE PROGRAMMES SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

2. STANDARDISATION. LACK OF STANDARDISATION
AND INTER-OPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN A MAJOR
OBSTACLE TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF AVAILABLE
RESOURCES. BOTH STANDARDISATION AND INTER-
OPERABILITY FACILITATE THE CO-OPERATION AMONG FORCES
OF DIFFERENT NATIONS AND ENHANCES THEIR OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS; STANDARDISATION ALSO SIMPLIFIES
TRAINING AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT, INCLUDING MAINTENANCE,
AND OPENS UP AVENUES FOR COST-SAVING JOINT ACTION AMONG
MEMBER COUNTRIES; MOREOVER, JOINT PROCUREMENT AND
PRODUCTION REDUCES THE CAPITAL OUTLAY PER ITEM OF
EQUIPMENT. THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STANDARDISATION AND
INTER-OPERABILITY ARE NUMEROUS AND WELL-KNOWN, BUT
MAJOR EFFORTS AND POLITICAL WILL ARE REQUIRED TO
ACHIEVE RESULTS.

23. CO-OPERATIVE PROJECTS. CO-OPERATIVE
PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT REMAIN A PRINCIPAL METHOD
OF MAKING BETTER USE OF RESOURCES. IN THIS
CONNECTION THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TWO-WAY STREET IN
DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE IS IMPORTANT. WHILST EACH NATION
BEARS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR EFFECTING
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EQUIPMENTS WHICH IT MUST PROVIDE
FOR ITS FORCES, IN MANY CASES THIS CAN BEST BE
ACHIEVED THROUGH MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS.
IT MUST BE AN ESTABLISHED AND CLEAR OBJECTIVE FOR EACH
NATION TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.

TECHNOLOGY

24. NATO COLLECTIVELY NEEDS TO MAINTAIN AN
EFFICIENT AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE. FOR THIS
PURPOSE NATO SHOULD SEEK A RATIONAL CO-ORDINATED
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS, WHICH
TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF COUNTRIES WITH
SMALLER INDUSTRIAL CAPACITIES, PROMOTES STANDARDISATION,
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AND FACILITATES VIGOROUS FOLLOW-UP IN AREAS IN WHICH
THE MILITARY PAY-OFF APPEARS SIGNIFICANT.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

25. TO FULFIL THEIR FUNCTIONS EFFECTIVELY NATO
FORCES MUST BE PROVIDED WITH AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF
LOGISTIC SUPPORT. STOCKS OF WAR RESERVE EQUIPMENT

SHOULD BE MODERN, AND COMPATIBLE WITH EQUIPMENT IN THE HANDS OF COMBAT UNITS. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE RADILY AVAILABLE IN THE PROBABLE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS AND BE RAPIDLY TRANSPORTABLE TO THE BATTLE AREA.

SUPPORT FROM THE CIVIL SECTOR

26. THE DETERRENT AND DEFENCE POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE DEPEND NOT ONLY ON A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION BUT EQUALLY ON THE EVIDENT READINESS OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY TO ENGAGE ITS POPULATION AND ITS CIVIL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL DEFENCE EFFORT. THE ORGANISATION OF SUPPORT FROM THE CIVIL SECTION SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE STRATEGIC AND OTHER PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THIS GUIDANCE. WITHIN THE BOUNDS SET BY NATIONAL LEGISLATION, THE AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES AND THE CIVIL INTERESTS OF THE POPULATION, IT SHOULD EMBRACE:

(A) THE FULLEST USE OF EXISTING CIVIL ASSETS AND FACILITIES;

(B) THE DIRECT AND SPECIFIC ASSOCIATION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY PLANS;

(C) CONSIDERATION OF DEFENCE NEEDS WHEN DEVELOPING CIVIL PROJECTS;

(D) PREPARATION FOR THE RAPID TRANSITION OF PEACETIME ECONOMIES TO AN EMERGENCY FOOTING.

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27. THE SUCCESSFUL CONTINUANCE OF NATO'S DEFENCE

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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POLICY DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE SUPPORT OF THE ELECTORATES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. SUCH SUPPORT WILL ONLY BE FORTHCOMING IF THE AMS AND METHODS BY WHICH MEMBER NATIONS COLLECTIVELY SEEK TO ENHANCE THEIR SECURITY-AND HTIS INCLUDES NATO'S STRATEGY-ARE EXPLAINED TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ACCEPTED BY PARLIAMENTS AS A WHOLE. THUS PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING WILL REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONSITUTENT ELEMENT OF OVERALL NATO DEFENCE POLICY. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENTS (AS WELL AS NATO) TO SEE THAT IT IS FOSTERED AND EXTENDED.

GUDANCE.

28. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE MINISTES GAVE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE LEVELS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES TO BE MAINTAINED, THE SACLE OF RESOURCES REQUIRED, THE NATURE OF TH CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS TO BE PURSUED AND THE CRITERIA TO BE ADOPTED FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITES. THEY DIRECTED THAT THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE USED TO GOVERN ALL DEFENCE
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PLANNING IN NATO, BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FOR HE PERIOD UP TO 1982 AND BEYOND.

DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

IN THE COUSE OF A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, MINISTERS WERE BRIEFED ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION, THEY REVIEWED THE PRESENT STATE OF NATO'S DEFENCES, AND TOOK NOTE OF PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE FIELDS OF RATIONALISATION, STANDARDISATION AND FLEXIBILITY IN NATO FORCES. THEY ALSO CONSIDERED THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

THEY DEVOTED SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CURRENT STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO COUNTRIES,

SOVIET MILITARY AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA AND THE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN ADJOINING AREAS.

AMONG THE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE THE
IMPROVEMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE ALLIANCE
AND THE FINANCING OF THE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME UP TO
1979. MINISTERS ALSO AGREED TO COMMISSION A JOINT STUDY OF THE
POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPING AND OPERATING AN AIRBORNE EARLY
WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM ON A CO-OPERATIVE BASIS TO IMPROVE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S AIR DEFENCES.

FINALLY MINISTERS LAID DOWN GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE
PLANNING IN NATO. THESE GUIDELINES RESTATE THE BASIC AIMS
AND STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE AND PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON
THE ADOPTION OF A LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT. THEY ALSO
PROVIDE A FRESH STIMULUS TO THE OPTIMUM USE OF RESOURCES THROUGH
STANDARDISATION AND GREATER CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS. THIS DOCUMENT
WILL PROVIDE A DIRECTIVE AND REFERENCE POINT FOR ALL DEFENCE
PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN NATO UP TO 1982 AND BEYOND. AN
UNCLASSIFIED VERSION IS ATTACHED.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO02578
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 SGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750599/abbrzjwe.tel
Line Count: 731
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 14
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 2301 B. STATE 096508
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <08 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE: UNCLASIFIED VERSION
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006